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Using the example of the European Constitution, this paper argues that 
ideology plays a much more important role in institutional change than has been 
indicated hitherto in the literature.  Rather than being an intellectual parlor-
game, Postmodernism has emerged through European high culture to find its 
voice in the new Constitution.  Although it was rejected by a critical mass of 
voters, the proposed Constitution offers a telling glimpse into the European 
intellectual mindset – especially since politicians are now bruiting the possibility 
of ratifying the constitution via compliant legislatures rather than fickle 
referenda.  Anomalies in the document are better explained by the post-World 
War Two emergence of postmodern philosophy in Europe than by more 




Theories of institutional change typically view the transformation of 
institutions as the result of interactions among different interests – whether 
imposed or emergent, intended or unintended.  While such approaches shed light 
on institutional change, something seems to be missing.  Do interest and 
competition really provide sufficient explanation, especially once we move 
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beyond the neoclassical assumption of perfect rationality?  The literature on 
sociotropic voting (Caplan 2002) and expressive voting (Brennan and Lomasky 
1993) along with some voices in New Institutional Economics (e.g., North 1990, 
North 1994, Pejovich 2003) indicates that institutional change does not emerge 
exclusively from power struggles or a cooperation game.   
Using the example of the proposed European Constitution as a reflection 
of Europe’s emergent postmodern philosophy, this paper argues that ideology 
plays a much more important role than has been indicated hitherto in the 
literature.  Rather than being an odd fancy relegated to the salons of Europe and 
isolated faculties of Philosophy, English, and Cultural Studies at American 
universities, Postmodernism has emerged through European high culture to find 
its voice in the European Constitution.  Although it was recently rejected by a 
critical mass of European voters, the proposed constitution offers a telling 
glimpse into the European intellectual mindset.  While the constitution may have 
been rejected by French and Dutch voters in national referenda, we have not 
heard the last of it; in the wake of the European Union's 50
th anniversary 
celebrations, the draft constitution is certain to resurface, if in modified form, 
most likely for ratification by national legislatures. Anomalies in the document 
are better explained by the post-World War Two emergence of postmodern 
ideology in Europe than by more traditional political economy explanations. 
This paper examines some constitutional anomalies, including the 
peculiar origin of European citizenship and identity, the emphasis on positive 
over negative rights, the predilection for process over result, and the rejection of 
the American Hobbesian world in favor of a European postmodern paradise of 
perpetual peace through diplomacy.  Section I offers background comments on 
institutions and institutional change.  Section II examines the EU constitution, its 
background and constitutional anomalies.  Section III presents a primer on the 
philosophy of Postmodernism.  Section IV ties in the previous two sections, 
explaining the EU constitution from a postmodern perspective.  The final section 
concludes. 
 
I.  Institutions and Institutional Change 
 
The role of institutions in mitigating transaction costs, facilitating the 
transfer of knowledge, and offering sound incentives has already been thoroughly 
described in the literature (see, e.g. Furubotn and Richter 2000, Langlois 1994 
and North 1994). 
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1.  Institutional Evolution 
But where do institutions come from, and how do they evolve?   
Institutions are inherently dynamic, as they reflect the mechanisms of a multitude 
of simultaneous interactions (see, e.g. North 1994 on institutional change and the 
role of learning in institutional evolution).  Different intellectual traditions see 
different sources and forms of institutional change, whether from a contractual 
renegotiation (Buchanan 1975 or Brennan and Buchanan 1985; generally, see 
Hardin 1988, Gordon 1976 and Voigt 1997) or from a more gradual emergence or 
coordination (Hayek 1967a, 1967b, 1979a [1973, 1976, 1979] and 1979b 1988, 
Hardin 1988 and 1999 or Gordon 1976) 
Something seems to be missing in all of these stories (although the 
emergent perspectives come closest).  Are interest and competition really 
sufficient to explain institutional change?  The literature on sociotropic voting 
(Caplan 2002) and expressive voting (Brennan and Lomasky 1993) indicates that 
the institutional story does not end with selfish actors interacting in the 
institutional arena, with institutional change emerging as a consequence of power 
struggles, conflicts of interest, or a cooperation game. 
Let us, then, digress for a moment and talk of ideology.  Hirshleifer (in 
North 1978) reminds us that there is more to social change than just political or 
economic competition, or a shift in relative prices:  "many of the really great 
social changes in human history have clearly stemmed from shifts in people’s 
goals for living.  Indeed, the economist is in danger of trivializing these 
fundamental values and goals by suggesting that they are merely arbitrary 
‘tastes’."  North (1994) further explains that  
[it] is necessary to dismantle the rationality assumption underlying 
economic theory in order to approach constructively the nature of human learning 
[and its influence on institutional change].  History demonstrates that ideas, 
ideologies, myths, dogmas, and prejudices matter; and an understanding of the 
way they evolve is necessary for further progress in developing a framework to 
understand societal change. 
He then defines ideology as "shared frameworks of mental models that 
groups of individuals possess that provide both an interpretation of the 
environment and a prescription as to how that environment should be ordered."  
This concept is clarified by Pejovich (2003) with the notion of prevailing culture, 
a community’s "mainstream" rules of the game. 
Once we have added ideology to the mix, a different picture emerges.  To 
be sure, ideology does not explain away the importance of interest or competition 
in determining institutional choice and evolution – but it does alter and complete 
the analysis.  Borrowing for a moment from microeconomics, we might think of 
the interplay between interest and ideology as that between a budget constraint   28 
and a utility function, where both are determinants of optimal quantity consumed.  
North (1994) explains how "it is more than just constitutional rules – it is also the 
ideological context that determines the acceptable range of choices."   
Drawing from a different tradition – philosophy – Pippin (1999, xvii) 
argues that "Modern institutions…presume a distinct sort of authority, a claim to 
allegiance based on distinct premises that are essentially philosophical claims."    
In recognizing the role of ideology in institutional change, this paper does 
not abandon the more traditional stories completely, but instead builds on them.  
To illustrate, it examines a particular case study – the proposed Constitution of 
the European Union.  The document shows the marks of competition among 
political and economic agents  and a consensus among the European powers.  But 
as we will also see, these two stories are not sufficient, and the injection of 
ideological analysis explains much that the traditional approaches cannot.  The 
European Constitution is a manifestation of a distinctly European ideology:  the 
philosophy of Postmodernism. 
 
2.  Constitutional Culture 
As a particularly relevant type of ideology, constitutional culture can be 
defined as an attitude about constitutional constraints and constitutionalism.  
Constitutional culture includes the implicit and explicit, stated and unstated, 
conscious and subconscious, thoughts, feelings, beliefs, impressions and norms a 
group holds about the nature, scope and function of constitutional constraints.  
Different groups in society (e.g. educated versus uneducated, élites versus 
masses, legal practitioners versus politicians, politicians versus the street, 
dirigiste versus laissez-faire,  etc.) can have different constitutional cultures.  In a 
linguistic simplification, I will refer to the predominant constitutional culture – 
the constitutional culture of the most powerful meso-group or the constitutional 
culture most widely shared – as the national constitutional culture, where 
appropriate. 
Constitutional culture is an element of political and civic culture (see 
Almond and Verba 1965; Putnam 1978 and 1993, Sartori 1965, or Franklin and 
Baum 1995) dealing specifically with constitutional attitudes; it is thus narrower, 
and does not include related parameters such as civic participation, political 
cognition, partisanship, pride in institutions, time-preference, tolerance, electoral 
participation, etc.  Constitutional culture contains only the elements pertaining to 
meta-rules, the general organization of law and society, and willingness to be 
constrained.  To be sure, the two (civic/political culture and constitutional 
culture) are related and intertwined.  But I focus here exclusively on 
constitutional culture, leaving the details of democracy and civic involvement to 
an already rich literature.   29 
Thus, constitutional culture reflects the most basic beliefs and attitudes 
about general organization, that is, not just the constitutional text itself, "but the 
entire network of attitudes, norms, behaviors and expectations among elites and 
publics that that surround and support the written instrument" (Burnham 1982, 
78, paraphrasing Aristotle).  As such, constitutional culture varies along a number 
of themes and questions beyond the actual constitutional text. 
  Is a constitution a permanent document, representing eternal truths or 
natural laws about human nature?  Or is it merely a set of organizational by-laws, 
to be amended as a reflection of the Zeitgeist? 
  Is the constitution a source of legal protection of rights, as enshrined 
perhaps in a bill of rights?  Or does the constitution merely establish the 
governance structures, legislatures, etc. that will protect those rights, themselves 
defined by the legislature, as reflection of the popular will? 
  If there is a conflict between the constitution and the popular will, as 
expressed by an electoral majority, which should prevail?  Should the 
constitution, as an expression of fundamentals, carry and act as a buffer against 
tyranny of the majority?  Or should the majority prevail, as the constitution is 
seen as a holdover from the past, giving undue influence to past power holders?  
In more concrete day-to-day terms, what if there is a conflict between the 
government and the constitution?  Should the legislature, as representative of the 
popular will, prevail?  Or should a body of constitutional review – almost 
certainly not democratically chosen – dictate proper constitutional conduct and 
have the power to nullify acts of parliament or the executive?  To what extent, 
and under what circumstances?  Who is to interpret the constitution?  Should 
details be left to the text, to the executive, to the judiciary to popular referendum, 
or to the legislative majority?  Or to the military? 
  What if there is a conflict between the constitution and political 
expediency?  Which should carry?  The constitution, as long-term arrangement 
and compromise?  Or should the constitution be bypassed, as a thwart to 
efficiency, expediency or "progress."  And, in dire circumstances, when should 
the constitution (or elements thereof) be suspended, say by a military coup? 
  How is the constitution to be amended?  Should it be amended by 
simple majority, just like any other act of legislature?  Or is it important enough 
that a super-majority, or even a special constitutional convention, ought to be 
required? 
  Is the constitution widely accepted as a coordinating mechanism?  Or 
is it merely seen as an unfair increase of transaction costs, to benefit those who 
established it?  Should we accept constitutional constraints, while remaining free 
to complain about them?  Or should we (or do we) ignore or rebel against those   30 
we do not like, or with whom we disagree?  Do we bow to those who hold power 
constitutionally?  Or do we merely acquiesce and do our best to undermine them? 
Contrary to existing definitions, I adopt a broader definition of 
constitutional culture, to incorporate all feelings and attitudes about 
constitutionalism, and not just a constitutional culture that accepts constitutional 
constraints.  Thus, a given constitutional culture can reject constitutionalism 
outright, if expediency is valued more than principle.  In fact, such cases of 
rejection (constitutional failure) and the shifting subtleties of constitutional 
culture within general acceptance (constitutional maintenance) are indeed more 
instructive than the narrower definitions presented above from the literature.  For 
details on the definition of constitutional culture, see Wenzel 2007a; for 
methodological considerations, see Wenzel 2007c and 2007h; for general 
applications, see Wenzel 2006 and 2007b; for questions of matching 
constitutional culture with parchment see 2007d and 2007e, as well as 2007f and 
2007g for case studies.  For now, suffice it to say that constitutional culture 
affects the choice of parchment (in addition to the likelihood of success of any 
given constitutional system). 
 
II.  From Interest To Ideology:  The EU Constitution 
 
The European Union rose sphinx-like from the ashes of a traumatized 
post-World War Two Europe.  Although the vision of a "United States of 
Europe" was present at the creation, the transformation from warring European 
states to the present European Union was gradual – and took more than half a 
century to accomplish.  The European Constitution does, to an extent, represent 
the traditional story about unintended consequences from competition and the 
intended consequences of coordination.   
 
1.  The Road from Rome to Brussels 
From a loose commercial coalition started in the rubble of post-war 
Europe, to a more formal European Community started in 1957 with the Treaty of 
Rome, the European project has evolved into a European Union of 27 members, 
complete with its own institutions, a common currency
1, a unified central bank, a 
common market, and limited restrictions on internal immigration.   
How did the EU evolve from a collection of disparate countries (that had 
been fighting for the better part of the last millennium) into an increasingly 
unified entity?  Two stories can be told from the traditional perspectives of 
                                                 
1 If only 13 of the 27 member states of the European Union.   31 
institutional change, i.e. an economic analysis starting from incentives, 
competition and unintended consequences. 
a.  The EU as Coordination Game 
The first and simplest story comes from analysis of the EU as a 
coordination game.  The emergence of the European Union can be seen simply as 
a coordination game among the European states (what Hardin (1999) calls 
"politically significant" forces or "interests that matter" ).  After centuries of 
warfare, culminating in the carnage of World War Two, Europe was exhausted 
and broken. The original purpose of the European Community (through the 
European Coal and Steel agreements in 1951) was to intertwine the economies of 
France and Germany so tightly that it would be impossible for them to engage in 
another war.  The European Union, on a very basic level, can be seen simply as a 
coordinating device for all the players in the European football game to play fair 
with each other – and gain strength through cooperation.   
b.  The Lobbyists and the Lobbied:  the EU as Unintended 
Consequence 
Instead of viewing institutional change as an intentional result of 
coordination efforts, we can view it as the "unintended result of market 
interactions" (see, e.g. Langlois 1992) – in this case, the competition among 
lobbyists seeking rents from the growing European Union. 
An alternative to the coordination game explanation is that the European 
Union – rather than being the intended result of negotiation among the politically 
significant actors in Europe – is the unintended consequence of rent-seeking 
activity.  We can thus see the European Union’s penchant for regulation as an 
extension of the Franco-German welfare state, slowly harmonizing (always up, 
rather than down) the regulatory and tax regimes of the different European 
countries to reduce internal competition (de Jasay 2003a and 2003b).  States, 
however, are not the only lobbyists in Europe:  the lobbyists themselves also have 
an interest in the story.  Thus, Petroni (2003) argues that, although the EU was 
originally established to avoid war through trade and industrial intertwining, the 
lawyers and judges quickly took over the politicians’ project.  Their principal 
tools were strategic legal obfuscation (see Howe 2004) and the doctrine of acquis 
communautaire.  According to this principle – which was established by the 
European Court of Justice’s judicial fiat rather than by treaty or legislation – any 
power or jurisdiction relinquished by the member states to the EU (whether by 
treaty or by the Court) remains an undisputed EU power or jurisdiction in so-
called "similar" cases, as determined by the Court – rather than according to the 
letter or particulars of future treaties and cases. 
Anderson (1994) offers a theoretical addition to this story.  Instead of the 
State as merely a regulation- and rent-producing black box lobbied by different   32 
rent-seekers, we now have the addition of government as another element in the 
lobbying equation.  After all, the State and its bureaucrats also have an interest in 
institutional change.  Just as the European Court has increased its own power by 
judicial fiat, the EU institutions themselves have lobbied for greater growth.   
Thus, 18 of 66 delegates to the European Constitutional Convention (and four of 
12 of the Convention’s Presidium) represented European Union institutions, 
rather than member states or the people thereof.  More importantly, with the 
addition of a Convention president and two vice presidents, the "recent European 
Convention was constructed so that the median voter of the convention had a bias 
in favor of centralization" (European Constitutional Group 2004).  Not 
surprisingly, more centralization is exactly what the Convention produced – to 
the greater glory of existing EU institutions (see also de Jasay 2003a and 2003b). 
 
2.  The Constitutional Document:  Beyond Mere Interest? 
For all their descriptive powers, these two traditional stories of 
institutional change do not sufficiently explain the overall thrust of the European 
Constitution.  Beyond length and lack of clarity, the document is bizarre at best; 
in fact, Pini (2003) has gone so far as to describe it as "a constitutionalist’s 
delusion,"  "a political aberration," and "not a constitution – not theoretically, not 
practically."  As the 126-page behemoth reads more like a spending bill than a 
constitution, I simplify the analysis into three salient representative themes:   
citizenship, rights, and strategic obfuscation. 
a.  Citizenship and Identity 
In the American model, government derives its legitimacy up from the 
people.  There is no such sense in the European case, where the constitution 
comes first, then citizenship derives from the document (similar to a 
condominium association in the US).  The oddity continues with a tautological 
top-down, super-national identity:   in a circular argument, the constitution is 
based on a sense of "Europeanness" that is itself derived from the constitution.  
European identity – rather than natural law in the American tradition, or the 
popular will in the continental Rousseau-Hegelian tradition – has become the 
philosophical foundation (see, generally, Petroni 2004). 
Similarly, delegates to the Constitutional Convention agonized over the 
proper wording and substance for the philosophical foundations of Europe.   
Although some  delegates pushed for inclusion of a reference to Europe’s 
Christian heritage, that wording was deemed too controversial, and was replaced 
by a milder acknowledgement of Europe’s "Graeco-Roman and Enlightenment 
tradition" (de Jasay 2003a and 2003b).   33 
b. Rights 
The fundamental purpose of a constitution is to establish the basic 
parameters of sound government and protect rights – to "impose significant 
constraints on government, whatever form it takes (majority rule or otherwise)" 
(Barry 1990; see also Hayek 1960, European Constitutional Group 2004 and Pini 
2003).  The European constitution does neither.  By its sheer size (126 pages in 
the French original), it cannot be said to set up basic parameters.  Instead, it 
attempts to set up the detailed mechanics of European federalism. Furthermore, 
Pini (2003) worries that the constitution, instead of limiting state power and 
protecting rights, is not sufficiently abstract and removed from the foibles of in-
period politics (as a good constitution should be), and that it "adds rules, as 
always"  (see also European Constitutional Group 2004). 
The length and detail of the document underscore the radically different 
philosophies of the American and European documents.  Madison’s constitution 
set forth the limits of state action, establishing "islands of regulation in a sea of 
liberty."  Giscard d’Estaing’s constitution, conversely, establishes "islands of 
liberty in a sea of regulation" (see Barnett 1991 and 2004.)  Just as citizenship is 
granted from the top down, so are rights.  Petroni (2003) explains that there are 
no individual rights under the EU constitution:  rights are those given by the 
constitution to the people.  In this top-down spirit, the EU constitution places 
greater emphasis on (so-called) positive than negative rights – along with the 
member- and super-state’s responsibilities in "guaranteeing" them.
1 
                                                 
1 The inclusion of positive "rights" is a contradictory jinx for a constitution.  As I return to this 
point throughout, I should make a note here on the distinction between negative rights (life, 
liberty, the pursuit of happiness) and the fiction of "positive rights" ("right" to a job, to housing, to 
happiness, to education, etc.).  Rand (1966, 322-325) explains it best: 
The concept of a "right" pertains only to action – specifically, to freedom of action.  It means 
freedom from physical compulsion, coercion or interference by other men. 
Thus, for every individual, a right is the moral sanction of ...his freedom to act on his own 
judgment, for his own goals, by his own voluntary, uncoerced choice.  As to his neighbors, his 
rights impose no obligations on them except of a negative kind:  to abstain from violating his 
rights....   
[As for so-called "positive rights,"], jobs, food, clothing, recreation (!), homes, medical care, 
education, etc. do not grow in nature.  These are man-made values – goods and services 
produced by men.  Who is to provide them? 
If some men are entitled by right to the products of the work of others, it means that those 
others are deprived of rights and condemned to slave labor. 
Any alleged "right" of one man, which necessitates the violation of the rights of another, is not 
and cannot be a right. 
No man can have a right to impose an unchosen obligation, an unrewarded duty or an 
involuntary servitude on another man.  There can be no such thing as "the right to enslave." 
A right does not include the material implementation of that right by other men; it includes 
only the freedom to earn that implementation by one's own effort....   34 
c.  Muddle, obscurity and subterfuge 
The mere length of the EU Constitution makes it a delight for sadistic law 
professors.  The text of the US Constitution is comparatively simple and 
straightforward, yet has generated volumes of controversy and interpretation.   
One can only imagine the seeds of confusion, conflict and interpretation strewn in 
the long and complex European text.  As described above, a plausible story has 
been told that the lawyers and judges co-opted the original European project.  By 
making things more legalistically complicated, these high priests of constitutional 
interpretation stand to gain.   
But the story does not end there.  Howe (2004) explains the institutional 
mission creep and jurisprudence of European legal interpretation.  The European 
Commission (the EU’s executive arm) has been "using powers for one purpose to 
serve a quite different…purpose."  The EU Constitution’s "general 
provisions…will encourage the Commission and the ECJ [European Court of 
Justice] to interpret EU powers even more broadly than they do at present."   
Furthermore, the Court has not been an innocent bystander in this process.  In 
addition to expanding its own powers and Union powers through creative 
interpretations and through the principle of acquis communautaire defined above, 
the Court has been manipulating jurisdiction.  Howe (2004) explains how the 
Court "interprets the legal texts which it enforces largely by reference to their 
‘objects and purposes.’  This means…that identically worded provisions in two 
different treaties can be interpreted to have very different effects."  Things will 
only get worse with the new constitution, as "changing the legal basis of the EU 
from a series of treaties to a self-contained Constitution would fundamentally alter 
the Court’s view of the ‘objects and purposes’ of the legal texts which it is applying." 
 
                                                                                                                                      
Any undertaking that involves more than one man, requires the voluntary consent of every 
participant.  Every one of them has the right to make his own decision, but none has the right 
to force his decision on others. 
There is no such thing as "a right to a job" – there is only the right of free trade, that is:  a 
man's right to take a job if another man chooses to hire him.  There is no "right to a home," on 
the right of free trade: the right to build a home or to buy it.  There are not "rights to a 'fair' 
wage or a 'fair' price" if no one chooses to pay it, to hire a man or to buy his product.  There 
are no "rights of consumers" to milk, shoes, movies or champagne (there is only the right to 
manufacture them oneself)... 
The presence of positive "rights" in a constitution is problematic (beyond the patent philosophical 
absurdity).  Indeed, it is contradictory at best, and schizophrenic at worst, to commingle the 
protection of negative rights with positive "rights" (which imply, ipso facto, a violation of the 
negative rights of those forced to provide the goods or services to which an alleged positive "right" 
is created).  Feeding the hungry is surely a noble goal, and worthy of a societal (and thus perhaps 
constitutional) aspiration – but to invent a "right to eat" and thus violate property rights is an ill-
omened start for constitutional restraints on government.   35 
Robinson (2004) explains that such "constitutional muddle" is intentional, 
and has served the purposes of European centralizers.  Unable to obtain their 
political goals immediately, they have resorted to legalistic obfuscation and 
unclear constitutional verbiage to achieve their aims through "subterfuge," 
"confus[ing] the citizens of various member states [in Europe’s] ‘Journey to an 
Unknown Destination’."  Again, the lawyers, judges and Convention delegates 
remain the high priests in the interpretation of an intentionally confusing 
document; the incentives are clear.
1  
In a telling example, Petroni (2004) describes how the Constitution 
clearly defines "human health" as a function specifically reserved for the 
member-states and shielded from EU jurisdiction.  Simultaneously, the 
Constitution enumerates "public health" as a European Union function – but does 
not define a distinction between "human health" and "public health"! 
 
III.  A Philosophical Parenthesis (… or "Postmodernism:  A Primer") 
 
At this point, a philosophical parenthesis becomes necessary.  Indeed, 
although much of the European project makes sense as a simple coordination 
game or from a rent-seeking perspective, the constitutional anomalies described 
in the previous section (and the EU as a whole) cannot be explained by traditional 
economic theories of politics alone.  These constitutional themes, along with a 
number of demonstrated preferences from the EU, represent a pattern of behavior 
and attitude.  The pattern is, in fact, so striking, that one can speak of a European 
Weltanschauung – a way of looking at the world, a way of engaging it, a way of 
acting – that is, influencing the prevalent constitutional culture of the European 
Union.  That Weltanschauung is Postmodernism, hence the need for a brief 
philosophical primer. 
Like the European project, Postmodernism sprang forth from the horror 
and destruction of World War Two in Europe.  But its roots run deeper, to the 
19
th century.  The philosophy stands in contrast, first and foremost, to Modernism 
(also known as the Enlightenment project).
2 
                                                 
1 Such self-serving interpretation would seem to parallel the political sleight of hand that is likely 
in the constitution's imminent ratification.  Having failed to convince the people, and having failed 
by referendum, politicians of EU member countires are now bruiting the possibility of adopting 
the constitution via the back door of parliamentary majority. 
2 N.B.  Out of simplicity, I am conflating two very different (and often contradictory) strands of 
Enlightenment thought, viz. the Scottish and Continental Enlightenments.  This is a dangerous – if 
far too common – conflation, as the Scots emphasized humility, reason grounded in faith, and a 
healthy acceptance of human nature, whereas the Continentals lapsed into a hubristic cult of 
reason, leading to social engineering, a complete negation of the individual in favor of some 
putative "greater" or "common" good – and, bluntly, Auschwitz and the Gulag.  As much as I   36 
Starting roughly in the 17
th century, Modernism (the Enlightenment) 
replaced the pre-modern appeal to faith with an appeal to reason.  Without 
lapsing into the details of philosophical theory (see Yack 1986, Harvey 1989 and 
Pippin 1999 for such details), the implications of Modernism ring familiar, as 
they are still with us today:  the modern nation-state, with legitimacy derived 
from the people rather than from the monarch's divine right; the supreme 
authority of reason (over tradition or faith); human rights; free markets; and the 
mastery of nature through science and technology (Pippin 1999, 4-5).   Harvey 
(1989, 12) explains how the purpose of the modern project was 
to use the accumulation of knowledge generated by many individuals 
working freely and creatively for the pursuit of human emancipation and the 
enrichment of daily life.  The scientific domination of nature promised freedom 
from scarcity, want, and the arbitrariness of natural calamity.  The development 
of rational forms of social organization and rational modes of thought promised 
liberation from the irrationalities of myth, religious superstition, release from the 
arbitrary use of power as well as from the dark side of our human natures.  Only 
through such a project could the universal, eternal, and the immutable qualities of 
all humanity be revealed.    
Habermas (1983, 9) adds that the early Moderns had "the extravagant 
expectation that the arts and sciences would promote not only the control of 
natural forces but also understanding of the world and of the self, moral progress, 
the justice of institutions and even the happiness of human beings."   Modernism 
was a hopeful, excited project, an optimistic unleashing of the human spirit and 
previously untapped human creativity, after earlier stifling by the bonds of 
tradition and faith. 
Modernism offered a new epistemological appeal, detached from earlier 
religious confines.  Harvey (1989, 13) explains that Modernity was "a secular 
movement that sought the demystification and desacralization of knowledge and 
social organization in order to liberate human beings from their chains."  Even as 
it broke from the earlier religious monopoly, Modernity did not shed transcendent 
foundations entirely; for example, Kurtz (1986, 12) writes that 'the issue of 
Modernity was fundamentally a conflict between ecclesiastical authority and the 
authority of independent scholars,' i.e. a new approach to religion, rather than a 
                                                                                                                                      
shudder to conflate these two lines of thought, I must resign myself to the fact that they are indeed 
conflated in the popular – and intellectual – mind; the postmodern reaction –  if it is indeed a 
reaction to Auschwitz, the Gulag, the destruction of the environment through ill-defined property 
rights and the industrialization of war, all of which are necessary and inevitable consequences of 
the Continental Enlightenment –  makes perfect sense.  For details on the two enlightenments, see 
Hayek 1967, 1978 and 1979, Hampson 1991, Boettke 2000, Porter 2001, Himmelfarb 2004 and 
Wenzel 2007i.     37 
total jettisoning of faith – what Daly (1985) refers to as 'the Kantian ideal of 
religion within the limits of reason.' 
But the modern project was not without its doubters.  As early as the 19
th 
century, the very premises of Modernism began to be called into question.  What 
began as doubts about the limitations of reason (initially brushed aside by 
Modernism's confident optimism) evolved into a fuller critique.  Modernism was 
seen to be spiritually weakening at best, and downright destructive at worst.   
Pippin (1999, xii) describes 'the widespread nineteenth century suspicions (at 
least on the European continent) that ... the two greatest accomplishments of 
world civilization, modern natural science and technology, and a progressive, 
liberal democratic culture, were…slowly and inexorably enervating and 
spiritually destroying that very culture.'  In many ways, such early grumblings 
foreshadowed much of the 20
th century's ugliness and many of its problems.  The 
scale and horror of two world wars galvanized the theoretical concerns.  Pippin 
(1999, 7) explains that: the great self-confidence and progressivism characteristic 
of the modern enterprise and especially what seemed its nineteenth-century 
fruition, all looked even more difficult to accept after the historical horrors of the 
twentieth century.  The fact that art, intellectual pursuits, the development of the 
natural sciences, many branches of scholarship flourished in close spatial, 
temporal proximity to massacre and the death camps has raised for many doubts 
about not only Modernity's self-assurances, but about all of Western culture, has 
raised the issue:  Why did humanistic traditions and models of conduct prove so 
fragile a barrier against political bestiality? 
Harvey (1989, 13) echoes this thought, explaining that 'whether or not the 
Enlightenment project was doomed from the start to plunge us into a Kafkaesque 
world, whether or not it was bound to lead to Auschwitz and Hiroshima, and 
whether it has any power left to inform and inspire contemporary thought and 
action, are crucial questions.'   
According to the alternative school of Post-modernism, the modern 
project, 'laudable though it may have been at one time, has in its turn come to 
oppress humankind, and to force it into certain set ways of action' (Sim 2001, 
vii); Zuckert (1996, 1) traces the concerns back to the 'conviction that modern 
rationalism ha[d] exhausted its promise and possibilities', starting with Nietzsche.   
Where some saw aberrations or challenges within the modern project, 
Postmodernism saw unavoidable and logical consequences:   colonialism; 
fascism/communism and industrially planned genocide; the destruction of the 
natural environment in the name of unfettered progress and technology; the 
North's 'exploitation' of the South; the horrors of modern warfare, compounded 
by methodical application of the very science and technology initially meant to 
liberate humanity; and the spiritual poverty and alienation of mass consumerism.    38 
Harvey (1989:  13) explains that 'there are those – and this is... the core of post-
modernist philosophical thought – who insist that we should, in the name of 
human emancipation, abandon the Enlightenment project entirely.'  The 
postmodern rejection of the modern project is thus both (a) theoretical and 
methodological, and (b) applied and political.  
On the theoretical and methodological side, we see a 'rejection of many, if 
not most, of the cultural certainties in which life in the West has been structured 
over the last couple of centuries' (Sim 2001, vii).  Specifically, Postmodernism 
attacks the very core of the modern project, questioning the existence of any truth 
and the ability of human reason to find it.  As a radical alternative, 
Postmodernism holds that knowledge and belief are products of environment, and 
that we should thus speak of contingent 'narratives' rather than absolute truths.  
Naturally, different people will have different narratives, as they have different 
cultural, intellectual, economic and sociological backgrounds.  Thus, a 
postmodern comparison of narratives replaces the modern search for truth.  On 
the applied and political side, two principal consequences follow from this radical 
relativism.   
First, Postmodernism rejects any claim of absolute truth as an attempt to 
impose one worldview over others.  No individual narrative has a legitimate right 
to exclude any other; everything is contingent on context and background, so 
there is no 'inside track' to truth (see Natoli 1997).  In the vocabulary of 
Postmodernism, claims of superiority or truth are referred to as attempts to 
impose a 'master voice' or 'meta-narrative' (see Lyotard 1981).  'Postmodern 
politics then becomes a continuous negotiating of various compromises as to 
what meanings and values are to be represented in the social order and to what 
degree.  Outcomes here are relative to time and place and the already established 
dispositions of power' (Natoli 1997, 18).  There follows a suspicion of certainty 
and philosophical foundations, and the replacement of absolute 'meaning' with 
relative 'interpretation.'  Pippin (1999,  41) explains that 'for many so-called 
postmodernists, modernism represents the last game played by Western bourgeois 
high culture, an elitist code designed only to preserve and celebrate the... point of 
view of an exhausted but still immensely powerful middle class.' 
Second, Postmodernism challenges the main tenets of modern political 
economy.  Thus, the modern nation-state becomes an instrument of centralized 
repression of minority voices; the supreme authority of reason ends up being but 
the 'voice' of those in power attempting to impose their personal views as 'the 
master voice' over all other narratives; natural rights are not universal values, but 
a Western concept, imposed on the rest of the world by 'cultural imperialism' or 
even force; free markets are seen as the freezing of one particular institutional 
arrangement that benefits those who have the power to expand their wealth   39 
through addictive, exploitative and spiritually hollow mass consumerism; and the 
mastery of nature through science and technology becomes an excuse for 
'ecocide' in the empty name of progress. 
Postmodernism is not just a cute way of interpreting literature, to the 
delight of sadistic faculty and the terror of students; it has slowly crept into the 
Western worldview.  Huyssens (1984) asserts that: 
What appears on one level as the latest fad, advertising pitch and hollow 
spectacle is part of a slowly emerging cultural transformation in Western 
societies, a change in sensibility for which the term "post-modern" is actually, at 
least for now, wholly adequate.  The nature and depth of that transformation are 
debatable, but transformation it is.  I don't want to be misunderstood as claiming 
that there is a wholesale paradigm shift of the cultural, social and economic 
orders; any such claim clearly would be overblown.  But in an important sector of 
our culture there is a noticeable shift in sensibility, practices and discourse 
formations which distinguishes a post-modern set of assumptions, experiences 
and propositions from that of a preceding period. 
This is just a précis, intended to provide an overview of the literature on 
and trends in Postmodernism and religion, rather than a detailed explanation of 
postmodern theory.  Terms such as simulacra, différance, the Other and (k)nots 
are thus eschewed, as are such technical subtleties as described by Connor (2004, 
4):  'How one capitalized or hyphenated – "post-modern," "Post-Modern," 
"postmodern," or "Postmodern" – seemed to many to matter a great deal, along 
with whether one chose to refer to "Postmodernism," "postmodernity," or simply 
"the postmodern".'  Such details are beyond the present scope, and the interested 
reader is invited to visit the literature for greater depth that goes beyond the 
limited scope of this review (see, e.g.,  Lyotard 1981, Habermas 1983, Huyssens 
1984, Harvey 1989, Bauman 1992, 1995 and 1997, Bertens 1995, Natoli 1997, 
Sim 2001 or Connor 2004). 
 
IV.  Understanding The European Union As A Postmodern Project 
 
This brief description might lead to the conclusion that Postmodernism is 
just a trendy philosophy, a parlor-game for European intellectuals and isolated 
professors at a handful of Northeastern American universities.  And with good 
reason… 
However, lest we be tempted to consider Postmodernism as an obscure 
academic phenomenon, Pippin (1999, xvii) reminds us that "Modern 
institutions…presume a sort of distinct authority, a claim to allegiance based on 
distinct premises that are essentially philosophical claims and do not remain 
affected by skeptical attacks, however complicated and abstract the form of those   40 
attacks can initially be.  If the principles supporting such claims to authority 
begin to look prejudiced or arbitrary, much more comes to be at stake than 
journal arguments or books reviews."   
Indeed, an analysis of the European Constitution as a Postmodern 
document leads to a different understanding.  Traditional explanations from the 
fields of New Institutional Economics,  Public Choice and Constitutional Political 
Economy shed much light on the European project.  But one can fully understand 
the EU and its new constitutional text only from an ideological standpoint, 
enriching economic analysis of institutions with an understanding of 
constitutional culture and postmodern philosophy.  
 
1. Constitutional  Themes 
The three constitutional anomalies from section III.2 above (identity, 
rights, and textual obscurity) can best be explained through the lens of 
Postmodernism. 
a. Identity 
In a postmodern context, which eschews one "overarching story" in favor 
of  competing narratives, Europe is the new galvanizing factor.  Rather than the 
modern nation-state, postmodern Europe is an umbrella that gives voice to 
regional and personal interests; "one of the main points of postmodernism…is 
that ‘the most particular is the most universal.’  So when it comes to ‘identity’ the 
trick for the constitutional experts writing the constitution was to express that by 
being very much themselves, they would be more European" (Prado 2004).  The 
European umbrella, along with the constitutional refusal to derive legitimacy 
from the people or nation-states, is a reflection of "[Postmodernism’s] ‘anything 
goes’ pluralism and its delirious celebration of difference."  (Sim 2001, 28)   
b. Rights 
Likewise, natural rights are considered a suspicious – and culturally 
contingent – holdover from Modernism.  Far better to emphasize positive "rights" 
(which are much more fluid and subject to interpretation).  The same goes for the 
safe, descriptive allusion to the "Graeco-Roman and Enlightenment heritage" 
over any appeal to Christianity and its tendency to impose a "meta-narrative."  
Naturally, a more traditional explanation would point to a pragmatic catering to 
Europe’s large Moslem minorities or Turkey’s possible entry into the EU.  But, 
again, the traditional story makes more sense with an added 
ideological/philosophical explanation. 
c. Textual  Obscurity 
The lack of clarity in the European Constitution goes beyond mere 
lawyers' games, and is better understood as postmodern interpretation over clear 
meaning.  Prado (2004) explains that    41 
[a] Constitution is, like every text, made out of language.  Thus, given the 
metaphoric nature of language…a Constitution written in the 21
st century is very 
open to a postmodern…analysis…  Plus, given the fact that many governments 
will ask their citizens to approve the Constitution via referendum, the openness to 
interpretation of every text (a main issue in postmodernism) will play a big role.  
Every government will have to ‘interpret’ the Constitution in a certain way to 
make it palatable to its own citizenry.  That’s postmodern practice – ‘meaning’ is 
never ‘closed’."    
Postmodernism sheds a whole new light on the EU Constitution’s textual 
obscurity and the European Court’s interpretation of a treaty’s purpose over its text. 
 
2.  Other European Preferences 
Space considerations prevent more detail, but other aspects of European 
policy are also made clear within a postmodern understanding.  Europe’s quasi-
religious preoccupation with environmental protection over economic growth, 
along with its adoption of the precautionary principle over rational, 
scientific/mathematical risk assessment, reflects the postmodern concern with 
scientific apprentices turning against their modern sorcerers.  Europe’s lack of 
military power and reluctance to use force can be understood as a (postmodern) 
state of "perpetual peace" through diplomacy, in contrast to the (very modern) 
Hobbesian world of military force in which the US continues to live (Kagan 
2002).  Europe’s predilection for diplomatic and bureaucratic process and 
dialogue – over results – can be understood as a postmodern consideration of 
competing narratives rather than imposition of one narrative as the "meta-
narrative."  And the list goes on. 
 
V.  Conclusion:  From University To Constitution 
 
The subtitle of Pippin’s (1999) book on Modernity as a Philosophical 
Problem ("On the dissatisfactions of European high culture") is no coincidence.  
Postmodernism has emerged from European high culture to find its voice in the 
new European Constitution.  Without consideration of ideology, without an 
understanding of contemporary Europe’s prevailing Weltanschauung, it would be 
impossible fully to understand the European project.  We thus see the importance 
of incorporating ideology as a factor in analyzing institutional change. 
This enriched analysis, however, begs a number of central questions.   
Specifically, where does ideological change come from?  Indeed, it is a safe 
assumption that most Europeans have not read Derrida, Rorty, Habermas, 
Nietzsche, and the other high priests of Postmodernism in any detail, if at all.  It 
is also safe to assume that most Europeans would fail a test on the basics of   42 
Postmodernism.  Yet Europe as a whole (as well as many Europeans, based on 
my own fledgling and informal economic anthropology) seems to embrace the 
Postmodern ideology, as reflected in its institutions and general Weltanschauung.  
Where, then, did Postmodernism come from?  Is it taught in the schools?  Has it 
made its way somehow into the popular culture, without being identified as such 
by the very people who embrace it?  And if the ideology’s main tenets do not 
explicitly exist in the minds of Europeans, where do they reside, and how are they 
transmitted?  In and through conventions, language, standards, and ever elusive 
"culture"?  
These remain unanswered questions, and the subject of further inquiry.
1  
It is tricky enough to study constitutional culture and ideology, then watch them 
emerge into formal institutional order.  But it will be even more intriguing to dig 
one step further, using the young discipline of economic anthropology, to study 
the very origins of culture and ideology.  I welcome further research. 
As for Europe, a critical mass of its voters has rejected the proposed 
Constitution of 2003.  But we have not heard the last from the constitutionalists 
and the federalists.  We can expect another draft Constitution before too long, if 
in the form of a treaty to be ratified by compliant legislatures rather than fickle 
voters.  In the meantime, the first proposal offers great insight into the 
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